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TAPA 146 (2016) 37–60

Documents in the Case: Demosthenes 23–24*

edwin carawan
Missouri State University
summary: In Demosthenes’ speeches we find documentary versions of laws

and decrees which were not included in the prepared text nor (apparently)
in early versions for circulation. Recent work on manuscript stichometry
suggests a pattern in what appear to be the earliest inserts. In Demosthenes
23 and 24, in cases against unlawful legislation, a significant set of documents was included in the line-count edition; these largely correspond to
the paragegrammenoi nomoi, the opposing laws listed in the indictment.
This finding suggests that the early editor either had that indictment in
hand or attempted to reconstruct it.

in the speeches that demosthenes wrote for himself and others to
deliver we find various laws and decrees which were not originally included
in the prepared text (for the speaker to study before trial) and not ordinarily
in the copies for circulation thereafter.1 Some of these statutes were central
to the case; others were merely illustrations of legal principle or incidental
history. Whether trivial or crucial, all these exhibits appear to have been
collected in a dossier for the clerk to read out to the court, as the speaker
prompts him to do, not for the speaker himself to recite. Yet a considerable set of such documents made their way into the manuscripts, where
they present a complicated set of problems. Often we can be confident of
For their constructive comments on the draft of this essay, I am much obliged to
the referees for TAPA and to Mirko Canevaro. For their handling of the tables and other
complications, I am also indebted to the editor and to Matthew Horrell. Any errors, of
course, are mine.
1 There are bound to be exceptions, as Dover pointed out (1968: 4–5 with n3): cases
where some text or excerpt of the document had to be included for publication or the
argument would be unintelligible (as in Lys. 10.15–20). But, for the usual pattern, see
MacDowell 1990: 43–47.
*
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the content, because the orator’s own words confirm it, but there is some
inconsistency or deviation from the usual formula, which arouses suspicion.
Occasionally, where the document goes beyond the orator’s summary, it
may represent historical research (or the editor’s recollection of it); often it
is a product of sheer ingenuity. Over the centuries of modern commentary
scholars have resorted to various approaches, but in the end, it often seems,
we resort to one subjective strategy or another: the defects are either tolerable or not, depending on prior assumptions about what the text has to
show. One approach guided by objective criteria emerged in the nineteenth
century with the examination of manuscript stichometry. Major branches
of the tradition show a line count that goes back to an ancient exemplar.
Originally, each hundred-line section was marked alphabetically, apparently
as a way to calculate how much the copyist was owed for the work.2 That
notation was retained after the line lengthened and the standard sections
slipped from a hundred lines to eighty or so, and it was dutifully maintained
even when later editors added documents that made some sections sprawl
beyond their original length. But, by contrast, the line count allows us to see
that some, relatively few of the documents were present in some form in that
first “line-count edition” (as I shall call it), when the extent of the text was
fixed for large-scale copying. It is that parameter of the material that is now
meticulously treated in Mirko Canevaro’s book (2013a) on the documents in
Demosthenes’ public speeches. Using a computerized letter count as a check
against the manuscript line count, Canevaro has identified an important set
of documents in Demosthenes’ public speeches which seem to have a special
claim to credibility because they were almost certainly included in that first
edition for wide publication and, from close scrutiny of content and usage,
they seem more reliable than the rest.
The most obvious package of these stichometric documents comes with
the clearest claim to authenticity: the set of laws in Against Aristokrates. These
can be verified from the orator’s comments and in a few instances from the
inscribed copy of the homicide law (IG i3 104). Relying largely on such solid
material, Canevaro offers an intriguing theory about the editorial process
that produced an Urexemplar with some documents included (2013a: 329):
in the generations after Demosthenes’ death, his nephew Demochares and
perhaps other admirers set about consolidating his legacy, and a standard

2 On the working principle, cf. Blum 1991: 157–58 [1977: 238–39], discounting the
theory that line count was also meant to serve as a check against insertions or deletions
(at n213 [257]).
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edition of the orator’s work was part of this project; in Athens, so soon after
the era of those speeches, they were able to consult original documents and
made the best use of what they could find. As a theory, it is plausible enough.
But in the two speeches where these stichometric documents are significant,
Demosthenes 23 and 24 (hereafter Aristokrates and Timokrates), there is a
pattern which suggests that the early editor worked with a particular focus:
he tried to incorporate the documents that were attached to the indictment
itself. This essay offers an alternative or refinement to Canevaro’s theory based
on that finding: we begin (in §§I-III) with an assessment of the documents
indicated in the stichometry for these two speeches, informed by the orators’
testimony about how that material should be treated at trial; then (§§IV-V)
we consider the disparities between one speech and the other and what those
differences suggest about the aims of the editor who included these documents, some perhaps verbatim from the text of record, others reconstructed
rather roughly.

i. the statutes quoted and other documents
cited in dem. 23
In Aristokrates the documents represent the ancient homicide law and a few
fundamental laws from the early restoration era (403/2 b.c.e. and thereafter), and these are indicated in the Urexemplar with high probability. In
this speech there are no documents that were not included (most probably)
in the line-count edition. There is a large set of documents cited later in the
speech, some that would arouse considerable interest, but none with even
a fragment inserted in the manuscript. For a few of these headings there is
contextual comment, perhaps sufficient to encourage the sort of “forgery” or
fabrication that embellished, say, the Crown speech (Dem. 18), but without
the quotation or summary that accompanied the documents earlier in this
speech. Here we find only the lemmata.
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table 1. citations without document in dem. 23
88–89, a set of decrees protecting

No further detail in

the person of the benefactor, providing

orator’s comment, after

“the same retribution as if one kill

initial description.

an Athenian”
115–16, letters of Kersobleptes

The orator gives context but
no summary.

151–52, decree, letters, testimony

Oblique reference to content.

159–62, six letters introduced

Orator gives isolated details, no

separately

summary.

168–69, testimony in trial of

Detailed background but no specific

Kephisodotos

content.

174–78, letters, agreements, and

Rich context but no phrasing or

decree regarding Thracian

specific content.

kings: 7 documents
183–84, letter of Chares

No phrasing or specific content.

Now, in table 2, compare the arrangement of material for the homicide
law and the early restoration laws, where documents found their way into the
Urexemplar. The importance of these statutes is emphasized in an epilogue
(215–18), and that summary provides the outline in the left column; in the
middle column the documents are summarized or excerpted, showing in italics
those clauses that diverge from the orator’s summary; the right column cites
Canevaro’s comment on whether the document goes back to the Urexemplar.3

The stichometry admits the possibility that the law at §22 and some material in
§§51–87 may have been omitted in the Urexemplar, but the whole ensemble is probably
original: see Canevaro 2013a: 18.
3

Documents in the Case: Demosthenes 23–24

41

table 2. paragegrammenoi in dem. 23
Epilogue of laws adduced with

documents inserted in main

the graphē = paragegrammenoi

argument (phrases in italics

in stichometry/ Urexemplar

not in argument)
215.Trial by (Areiopagos) council:
ὁ πρῶτος νόμος ἄντικρυς εἴρηκεν,
ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, τὴν βουλὴν
δικάζειν·

22. ΝΟΜΟΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ
ΦΟΝΙΚΩΝ ΝΟΜΩΝ ΤΩΝ
ΕΞ ΑΡΕΙΟΥ ΠΑΓΟΥ. Δικάζειν
δὲ τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ
φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας
καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν
τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.

The lemma is doubtful, but the
document “must be accepted”
(Canevaro 2013a: 46).

216. Not to torture or extort
ransom: οὐκ ἐᾷ μετὰ ταῦθ’ ὁ
δεύτερος νόμος οὐδὲ τὸν ἑαλωκότ’
ἀνδροφόνον λυμαίνεσθαι οὐδὲ
χρήματα πράττεσθαι· ...
ἀπάγειν ὁ νόμος ὡς τοὺς
θεσμοθέτας κελεύει ...

28. ΝΟΜΟΣ. Τοὺς δ’ ἀνδροφόνους
ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ
καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ <αʹ> ἄξονι
ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή,
μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν
ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ.
εἰσφέρειν δὲ <εἰς> τοὺς
ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί
εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ, τὴν δ’
ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν.

“... part of the Urexemplar”(48)

37. Penalties for reprisal against
killers in exile, ὥσπερ τὸν
Ἀθηναῖον κτείναντα, ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς ἐνέχεσθαι, ...

“part of the stichometric
edition” (56) §37 =IG i3 104.
26–29

44, ...τὰ ἴσα ὀφείλειν ὅσα περ
ἂν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ δράσῃ
51, Lawsuits barred for those who
act against trespassing killer,
δίκας μὴ εἶναι.

“part of the Urexemplar” (58)

53, Justifiable homicide in
athletic contest, ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών
(κτλ.), ... μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα.
60, Killing with impunity
against reprisal or abduction,
νηποινεὶ τεθνάναι.

53. “in all likelihood”
(65) (see §IV)

62, Entrenchment clause: Ὃς ἂν
ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης αἴτιος ᾖ τὸν
θεσμὸν συγχυθῆναι τόνδε, ἢ
μεταποιήσῃ αὐτόν, ἄτιμον εἶναι ...

“very likely” (71)

218. Hostage taking: τὸ
ἀνδρολήψιον, παρ’ οἷς ἂν ὁ
δράσας ᾖ, ἂν μὴ διδῶσι δίκας,
κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι μέχρι
τριῶν εἶναι·

82, Hostage taking in cases of
violent death, limited to three: Ἐάν
τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπὲρ
τούτου τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι
τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ... μέχρι τριῶν ....

“definitely part of the
Urexemplar” (73)

No laws ad hominem: οὐκ ἐᾷ
νόμον, ἂν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ
πᾶσι τιθῇ τις, εἰσφέρειν·
No decree superior to a law:
οὐκ ἐᾷ ψήφισμ’ ὁ νόμος
κυριώτερον εἶναι νόμου.

86, ΝΟΜΟΣ. Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ’
ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις.
87, ΝΟΜΟΣ. Ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν
μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου νόμου
κυριώτερον εἶναι.

“very likely” (74)

217. Lawful killing in various
instances: ἔστιν ἐφ’ οἷς ἀδικήμασιν
δέδωκεν ἀποκτείνειν ὁ νόμος·

Penalty (not mentioned in the
argument) shows “conscientious
insertion” (54).

51. stichometry uncertain but
“must be accepted” in
Urexemplar (62–64)

60. “very likely” (70)

“very likely” (75)
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Side by side, tables 1 and 2 suggest the first and most obvious question:
Why were the laws in §§22–87 copied into the main text and thus presented
as authentic documents, while none of the later exhibits (88–184) merited that
treatment? Part of the answer is indicated in the epilogue (215–18): the editor
who included this particular set of documents saw their crucial importance in
cases of this kind. This speech, like its companion piece, was written for the
first speaker in a suit against wrongful legislation: graphē paranomōn in the
case of Aristokrates; graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai in the case against
Timokrates. In principle, the jury’s decision should turn upon the contradiction between standing laws and the targeted measure, and it was this speaker’s
burden to present that case. It may also be true that an early editor had better
access to this one set of texts than to the others, but let us leave that question
for consideration together with the more complicated companion piece (in
§§III–V). First let us consider the way this speech distinguishes those documents crucial to the case.

ii. the “laws in evidence,”
paragegrammenoi nomoi
In Aristokrates the speech itself tells us that the documents included in the
Urexemplar were crucially important. In preface, as the prosecutor outlines
his arguments (18–21), he explains that he will first take up the laws that
stand in direct contradiction to Aristokrates’ decree, before proceeding to
the questions of public interest and the dubious merit of the honorand.4 For,
whatever weight is given to the other issues, it is the conflict with standing law
that proves the illegality of the decree, τὸ παράνομον (22). He begins with the
homicide laws and, as he proceeds through them, he repeatedly reminds the
jurors of his aim, to show that the decree is ἐναντίον τοῖς νόμοις. As he turns
to the fundamental laws, against any law ad hominem (ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρί) or any decree
superior to a law, he refers to the laws entered in evidence as those written
into the indictment or alongside the targeted law, as paragegrammenoi: there
are many other laws that the decree has violated, which he has not put on the
record in this way (οὓς οὐ παραγεγράμμεθα, 63). The ones he has entered in
evidence pose the clearest conflict, as he recalls in the epilogue (215), urging
the jurors, to think again περὶ δὴ τῶν νόμων ὧν παραγεγράμμεθα.

4 Aristokrates’ decree would have allowed summary arrest anywhere in the alliance,
against anyone who might kill the commander Charidemos. The documents arrayed
against it include the homicide laws and the rules barring any law for particular persons
or any decree that trumps a law.
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It was probably that description that prompted the editor to go back and
recover these laws (whatever his source). And he was given singular assistance
by the speechwriter: for the main content of these documents replicates verbatim or very nearly what the speaker has to say in his argument. So, as a working
hypothesis, let us suppose, wherever he got the documents, the ancient editor
was encouraged to include them by these two singular features: the content
is readily verifiable from the argument, and it is emphatically crucial to the
case, as the epilogue insists.
Here, in the graphē paranomōn against Aristokrates, the only documents
in the manuscript belong to this set of laws adduced in the indictment itself,
the παραγεγραμμένοι νόμοι that were listed alongside the targeted decree.
These were the laws with which Aristokrates’ decree was directly in conflict,
and they were thus crucial to the case. These laws in conflict, together with the
targeted decree, belonged to the full text of the graphē, which the prosecutor
Euthykles presented to the thesmothetai, for them to verify or amend at the
anakrisis; and that full text of the indictment would have been assembled on
the sanis that was posted for public consideration before the trial and then
displayed at court.5
In other procedures supporting documents were sometimes attached to
the indictment,6 but in any lawsuit against a law or decree the presentation
of paragegrammenoi nomoi was critical, as attested by Aischines in his case
of that type Against Ktesiphon. He describes how the targeted measure and
the laws that contradict it are presented side by side on the sanis—here called
sanidion, with the diminutive perhaps to emphasize how simple the comparison is. The jury should use that board like a carpenter’s rule, a kanōn, to
measure out justice (3.199–201):
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ, ὅταν εἰδέναι βουλώμεθα τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ τὸ
μή, τὸν κανόνα προσφέρομεν, ... οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῖς τῶν
παρανόμων παράκειται κανὼν τοῦ δικαίου τουτὶ τὸ σανίδιον, τὸ ψήφισμα
καὶ οἱ παραγεγραμμένοι νόμοι. ... (201) Ἐπειδὰν προελθὼν ἐνταυθοῖ
Κτησιφῶν διεξέλθῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῦτο δὴ τὸ συντεταγμένον αὐτῷ προοίμιον,
5 As shown by Mark Sundahl 2000: 36–50. What I call “the indictment” was assembled
on the sanis, the painted board posted at the heroes’ monument before the trial and then
exhibited at court. It comprised the text of record for the graphē itself (the charge in its
official wording) with the attachments that documented the points of law crucial to that
case: text of the targeted law or decree along with the laws adduced as conflicting with it.
6 E.g., For Euxenippos §30 (col. 40 Jensen): Hypereides tells how, in his eisangelia against
Philokrates for corruption and not speaking in the best interest of the demos, he attached
(ὑποκάτω παρέγραψα ... ὑπέγραψα) a copy of Philokrates’ decree in evidence of that crime.
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ἔπειτ’ ἐνδιατρίβῃ καὶ μὴ ἀπολογῆται, ὑπομνήσατ’ αὐτὸν ἀθορύβως τὸ
σανίδιον λαβεῖν καὶ τοὺς νόμους τῷ ψηφίσματι παραναγνῶναι. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ
προσποιῆται ὑμῶν ἀκούειν, μηδὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνου ἐθέλετε ἀκούειν.
Just as in construction, when we want to know what is right and what is not,
we apply a ruler (kanōn) ... so, too, in graphai paranomōn, this sanidion is
presented as a ruler of justice (matching) the decree with the laws (in conflict)
listed beside it. ... (201) And when Ktesiphon comes forward to recite that
prologue that was assigned to him, then carries on with no (proper) defense,
remind him, without any commotion, to take the sanidion and read the laws
alongside his decree. And if he pretends not to hear you, refuse to hear him!

Here he calls upon the jury to demand that Ktesiphon read the paragegrammenoi, and if the defendant ignores their prompting, they should shout him
down. That dramatic cue may have suggested to later readers that the litigants
themselves were obliged to present these crucial texts of the law out loud, as
though citing directly from the sanis; at least they were supposed to rehearse
them in a fairly specific and substantial treatment.7 After all, in Aristokrates
the main sections of those conflicted laws are repeated, often verbatim, by
Demosthenes’ client.8 Indeed, in this case the paragegrammenoi were so fully
cited that scholars have wondered: Who would bother to insert what purports
to be a separate text?9

iii. paragegrammenoi in timokrates
In the companion piece, Dem. 24, the argumentation is not nearly so finished
and the disposition of material may seem hardly comparable: we find many
more documents inserted, many that were not in the line-count edition; the
orator’s comments do not reveal the content quite so exhaustively; and we have
no epilogue focusing on the list of laws. But I think we can discern a similar
pattern: (1) Documents that were certainly or most probably included in the
Urexemplar correspond, for the most part, to the texts that were attached to the
graphē itself. And (2) much of this early documentation could be constructed
or verified from the orator’s comments. By contrast, the material that appears
7 Near the end of the list, Euthykles pretends to need reminding, what is the next law
adduced—Is there another one (82), or is that all? (87)—to emphasize how substantial
the list is.
8 For instance, the law inserted at §60 is promptly repeated word for word.
9 So queried Franke (1848: 3): Quis autem in animum inducat, ut hominem doctum, qui
legum, decretorum, testimoniorum carmina aliave antiquitatis monumenta conquisiverit et
in margine orationum adscribenda curaverit, etiam ea, quae quilibet puerulus nullo negotio
ipse ex oratione repeteret, diligenter literis consignata adscripisse credat?
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to have been added in subsequent editions does not bear so directly upon the
conflict between the targeted measure and the older body of law. And those
later addenda do not match quite so closely with the orator’s summary. The
insert for Epikrates’ decree (27) is a notable exception: this measure, convening
the special session of legislators where Timokrates’ law was enacted, matches
closely with the orator’s comment and may have been concocted from it; but
it is not indicated in the Urexemplar. That exception only reinforces the pattern: for Epikrates’ decree is read to show how unscrupulously Timokrates
brought his bill before the lawmakers; it has nothing to do with the matter of
“repugnancy” or conflict between the targeted law and the others, and so it
does not belong among the paragegrammenoi. Among documents that were
included in the Urexemplar there is another important exception: the text
of Diokles’ law (42) goes well beyond what the orator has to say about it (as
we consider in §IV). But perhaps the most notable difference between this
composition and Aristokrates’ is the treatment of the targeted measure itself.
Here the stichometric documents are introduced in much the same way
(39): these are the laws in evidence on the charge of illegality, showing that
the targeted measure is in direct conflict with standing laws (ἐναντίον ... τοῖς
οὖσι νόμοις). In this case the targeted law itself is read in full (39–40) for
comparison with older measures, and it is read again (at least in part) after the
laws in conflict have concluded (71). By contrast, in Aristokrates the targeted
decree was not read back in the course of the prosecutor’s speech; instead,
Euthykles quoted the main clauses and moved directly to the reading of laws
that conflict with it. He relied on the jury to recall the first sections of the
graphē, the charge itself and the law that it targeted, as read at the commencement of these proceedings. When he plunged into his legal argument, barely
seventeen sections into the speech, the text of the targeted decree hardly needs
repeating, so Euthykles simply focused on the features that stood in starkest
contradiction. But in Timokrates the full text of the targeted law is read back
at the beginning of the section listing the laws in conflict, and then part of
it is repeated at the transition to the next argument. As Canevaro concludes,
both readings were probably represented in the Urexemplar. Some of the
intervening material sprawls beyond the stichometry, but it looks as though
these two readings of the targeted law stood like bookends at the beginning
and conclusion of a section where the early editor tried to include paragegrammenoi in the line-count edition.
In the following table, documents in the first column, between the first
reading of Timokrates’ law and the second, largely correspond once again to
the paragegrammenoi nomoi, the laws in opposition to the measure indicted.
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table 3. documents in dem. 24 (with notes from
canevaro, et al.).
Largely within the line count,
with uncertainties noted

Outside stichometry,
not in Urexemplar

Matches orator’s comment, or
not = Independent

20–23, Epicheirotonia nomōn:
Independent: diverges from
elaborate protocol for review and
orator’s summary; cf. Schöll
correction of the corpus.
1886: 119–23; Canevaro 2013b:
		150–54.
27, Epikrates’ decree for nomothetai, Close match with orator’s
festival financing: not in stichometric summary, but probably
edition but indicated in scholia.
constructed from it; Piérart
		2000: 245–50.
33, MacDowell’s “Repeal Law”
(1975: 69–71): Τῶν δὲ νόμων
τῶν κειμένων μὴ ἐξεῖναι λῦσαι
μηδένα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν νομοθέταις.
39–40, Timokrates’ Surety Law, 		
target of Dem. 24, allowing state-		
debtors to post bond and avoid		
imprisonment.		

Begins abruptly, not closely
constructed from comment
(though partly prompted by it).

42, Diokles’ Law on the scope 		
of laws enacted “before 		
Eukleides” and those afterward.		

Largely Independent, prompted
by reference to starting dates vs.
statutes valid from enactment.

45, No reprieve for atimoi or state-		
debtors without granting immunity		
to the proposer, by vote of 6000.		

“contents ... correspond closely to
the following discussion”
(Canevaro 2013a: 128).

50, Law on supplication: Canevaro		
concludes (133), “impossible ... to		
determine” whether in Urexemplar.

Partly matches, with details
from other sources.

54, Law barring reprise of res 		
judicata: stichometry uncertain.		

“well-informed, yet clumsy
reconstruction” (142).

56, Restoration-era laws: ne bis in		
idem; dikai and diaitai remain valid,		
acts of the Thirty are invalid.
Possibly in Urexemplar (indicated
in P. Oxy 2.232).

Partly matching orator’s
comment.

59, Rule against laws ep’ andri (Dem.		
23.86) without quorum of 6000; 		
stichometry uncertain.		

“problems ...point to its
inauthenticity” (150).

63, Timokrates’ habeas corpus law		
—“impossible to calculate” whether		
in stichometry, probably in		
Urexemplar (151).

Only the last line bears
comment from the orator,
repeated for emphasis in §64.

71, Timokrates’ Surety Law, reprised		
(also indicated in Urexemplar)

[discussed below]

Closely matches orator’s comment
(Canevaro 2013a: 79, 87),
sometimes verbatim.

105, Laws on Theft, Abuse of
Parents, and Desertion

Independent, differs or extends
widely from orator’s summary.

149–51, Heliastic Oath, not in
stichometry but indicated in
POxy 2.232.

Independent, disparate
elements, prompted by
orator’s clues.
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There are a few provisions that are not strictly in conflict, and not all fall
within the stichometry,10 but the bulk of this section goes back to that linecount edition. By contrast, the middle column lists documents that were not
included in the Urexemplar. The third column, on the right, indicates how
closely the document corresponds to the speaker’s description.
In this case, as we noticed, the text of the targeted law has been added, like
another piece of the sanis (so to speak). But here again we can say (though
with graver reservations), the bulk of the documentation that found its way
into the line-count edition represents material from the graphē (accurately or
not). Later editions have padded the material in §§ 50–71, but most of these
provisions were presented in the line-count edition.
Now that pattern, prevailing in both speeches, suggests a particular focus,
not a haphazard selection.11 The documents included in the line-count edition
appear to be only those that would be included in the one piece of supporting
material that was likely to be kept intact for quite some time after the case: the
graphē itself, complete with the paragegrammenoi. How or whether the editor
had access to that text of the indictment remains to be considered (§§IV–V).
There were several possible sources. The prosecutor would probably keep a
reference copy of the indictment along with his copy of the speech, and the
early editor may have somehow gotten his hands on it. There would also be
some record of graphai in official archives and these may have been preserved
and accessible as late as the line-count edition.12 If not, the early editor may

10 As Canevaro notes (2013a: 21–23), some of the documents in §§50–71 would fit
the stichometry, but what we have stretches beyond the line count, as detailed below in
section IV.B. By contrast, documents that fall outside the stichometry often appear to
be fabricated and sometimes in error; on the legislation laws in §§20–23 and §33 see
Canevaro 2013b: 150–58.
11 Canevaro acknowledges that some documents may derive from the dossier submitted at trial, without singling out the paragegrammenoi. As for why some documents
were included and not others, he supposes (2013a: 329), it was “mainly due to chance:
Demochares added to the speeches those documents that he found among Demosthenes’
papers, or those famous enough for an Athenian orator and politician like himself to
remember by heart (this could be the case for the homicide laws included in the Against
Aristocrates, and perhaps for the law of Diocles found at Dem. 24.42)”; he may have drawn
upon the archive and stelai, but “[s]ometimes he reconstructed ... from Demosthenes’
discussion.”
12 Cf. Harris 2013, esp. 149 with n24. Some record of plaint and verdict may have
been kept in the Metroon, but it seems doubtful whether the full text of the indictment,
complete with paragegrammenoi, would be preserved in the central archive, especially in
moot cases such as Timokrates. Another resource would be the archives of the magistrates,
as considered below, n42.
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have consulted or relied on his recollection of historical compendia, such as
Krateros made of decrees and Theophrastos made of laws.13 In any event, the
editor knew of such records and recognized the crucial importance of this particular set of documents, so he set about recovering them, one way or another.
The other documents that were handed in to the clerk to be read at other
points in the speech, before and after the paragegrammenoi (table 1 and the
middle column of table 3), were a much more heterogeneous and cumbersome compilation: so far as we can see, none of those items was represented in
the line-count edition; and most of the documents that were later supplied, to
represent those items in the dossier, are rather less reliable. To be sure, those
later addenda include some valuable material, sometimes assembled by an
editor with “shrewd understanding of the workings of the Athenian assembly
and a remarkable knowledge of Attic official language.”14 But, after the crucial
documents had been covered, those later editors faced a more difficult task.

iv. divergent material in the line-count edition
For much of the stichometric material the early editor may have simply seized
upon “low-hanging fruit,” the measures that were most fully discussed in
the speech or most easily (re)collected. He recognized that these texts were
crucial to the lawsuit, as the epilogue to Aristokrates emphasizes, but in many
instances he was not obliged to consult any official record or historical authority. In each speech, however, there are a few notable exceptions, passages
where the document could not be concocted from the orator’s comment.
Some divergence may be a product of the editor’s ingenuity, but, on balance
those outliers weigh in favor of Canevaro’s finding: the stichometric documents tend to be more reliable because the editor could draw upon credible
sources outside the speech.
(A)
In Aristokrates, again, very little of the documentation in the
Urexemplar required any independent research; the bulk of it is readily constructed from the orator’s comment. One might even suppose that an early researcher, inspired by Peripatetic collection of constitutional material, gathered
in the margin laws that could be easily extracted from Demosthenes’ account;
For Krateros’s work as part of the Peripatetic project, see esp. Erdas 2002: 38–46.
As Canevaro 2013a: 332 explains some of the more plausible features in Dem. 24.20–
23; cf. Scafuro 2005, on Dem. 24.105. The most striking comparandum is the composite
in Makartatos (Dem. 43.57–58), from Drakon’s homicide law (= IG i3 104. 20–23) and
the later law for demarchs to dispose of bodies (considered largely reliable by Whitehead
1986: 137–38), neither indicated in the stichometry (Burger 1892: 25).
13
14
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and then another hand, prompted by the epilogue and other testimony on
paragegrammenoi, went back and copied those marginalia into the speech.15
I mention this possibility to emphasize how closely these documents track
the argument, and as a reminder that the conjuring of hypotheses and supporting materials, which inspired an industry of fabrication in later tradition,
was well under way in the era of the Urexemplar.16 But there are discrepancies
that seem to derive from a reliable source.
In the very first law cited, at §22, the stichometry is indecisive and the only
deviation is the phrase in the document identifying the court for intentional
homicide (and the like) as the council “(the one) on the Areiopagos.” When
the speaker comments on the law, he assigns jurisdiction simply to “the
council,” probably because everyone knew that the council in question was
not the democratic body of five hundred. Indeed, this law assigning murder
jurisdiction to the full body of former archons was probably a Solonian adaptation.17 In that context, “the council (the one) on the Areiopagos,” marked
a new and important distinction. Of course it is also the kind of clarification
that could have been added by the same hand who supplied the lemma, “A
Law from the Homicide Laws of the Areiopagos.”18
But the next document (§28) is squarely within the stichometry and shows
a more substantial deviation from the argument: this is the law allowing retributive killing or capture of a homicide “in the homeland” (ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ),
but barring brutality or extortion (λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν). That
prohibition is as far as the speaker goes in his recitation, but the insert has
clauses specifying the remedy and the penalty: the violator is to repay two-fold
the damage he has done; anyone willing may take his case to the competent
magistrate, depending on the nature of his claim (damage, assault, or abduction); and the heliaia will decide the case.19 Here we have another plausibly
Thus in Leptines (Dem. 20), a speech that proved otherwise immune to such intrusion, we find the one-line document (27–28), “no one shall be exempt from the trierarchy
except the nine archons.”
16 The regular use of hypothetical cases goes back at least to the time of Demosthenes
(Quint. Inst. 4.41–42), when, we are told, Aischines pioneered such exercises in invention
(Philost. VS 481). On this sophistic genre, with fabricated laws to frame the more provocative case, cf. Carawan 2001: 19; Canevaro 2013a: 355 n60, citing Theon Progymnasmata
103 Patillon, with Kennedy’s translation, 2003: 67.
17 Cf. Wallace 1989: 11–22; Carawan 1998: 89–91.
18 The lemma is less likely to have been included in the line-count edition; see Canevaro
2013a: 44–45.
19 Some of the phrasing may be muddled: Schelling’s emendation (1842: 68), εἰσφέρειν
δὲ <εἰς> τοὺς ἄρχοντας, is most probably right (accepted by Dilts; δ᾽ ἐ<ς> Butcher); and
15
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Solonian law, but with significant material that could not be extracted from
the speaker’s summary.
The next two documents, §37 and §44, agree with the orator’s recitation
almost verbatim; the first matches the inscription of Drakon’s law (IG i3 104.
26–27). But then, in Dem. 23.53, we find a notoriously problematic text of
the law on justifiable homicide20: “If one kill (another) in athletic contest
unwillingly, or overtaking (him) on the road or in warfare unwittingly ... the
killer is not to flee (or face exile) for such killing.”21 Most troublesome is the
vague phrase ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών, “overtaking on the road,” which receives no
comment from the orator.22 So short a phrase could have been added at a
later stage of transmission, without affecting the line count, or this disparity
might actually indicate revision in the law.23 The ancient lexicographers give
an explanation at least as old as Didymos, who commented extensively on
this speech in the first century b.c.e.,24 but that explanation proves doubtful.
The Didymian lexicon says that ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών refers to “ambush or lying
in wait,” and it compares the Homeric formula, “going the road or fighting ...
full force.” Harpokration’s version derives from the same tradition.25 If that
one wonders whether καταβλάψῃ is the right word for doing calculable damage. But,
allowing for such defects, Canevaro 2013a: 48–54 makes a good case for the authenticity
of this Solonian amendment.
20 Ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἄκων, ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας, ...
τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα. Modern editions usually punctuate with a comma
after καθελὼν, and most commentators treat the phrase as independent of ἀγνοήσας.
21 Sosin 2016 has offered an attractive explanation for this cryptic phrase and I translate
to allow for that meaning: in the archaic law ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών covered roadway encounters
including reckless violence such as Oidipous describes, OT 800–13.
22 Of course the fault may lie in the orator’s summary (utrum memoriae an exemplarium
vitio?), as Taylor considered (1774: 349); he reasoned that ἄκων implicitly governs the
phrase that follows it, or καθελών results from οὐκ ἐθέλων. Conversely, it is often assumed
that ἀγνοήσας governs ἐν ὁδῷ as well as ἐν πολέμῳ: discounted by Franke 1848: 9–11.
23 Drerup 1898: 277 allowed for some divergence in the tradition resulting from ancient
revision of the laws. On a similar assumption, Carawan 1998: 92–96 emphasized the disparity between Drakon’s original and the later law for the Delphinion court. Flament 2009:
120–21 also traces persistent deviation in the tradition back to revision of archaic laws.
24 P.Berol. inv. 5008. Much the same entry is found in an anonymous lexicon on Dem.
24 that relies on Didymos: Blass 1882. Gibson 1997 and 2002: 158 argues persuasively
that Harpokration and the lexicon that cites Didymos follow a common intermediary
and cannot derive directly from Didymos.
25 For text and commentary see Gibson 2002: 160, 165–66. Cf. Harpokration (Ο 2
Keaney = 217.12 Dindorf), Ὁδός: Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους φησὶν “ἢ ἐν
ὁδῷ καθελών” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν λόχῳ καὶ ἐνέδρᾳ. τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ Ὁμηρικόν φασιν
“ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι.”
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was Demosthenes’ reading, perhaps he neglected to comment because (he
thought) this instance was part of a broader exemption, for killing mistakenly in the course of hostilities. But the lexicographers are just guessing, and
Demosthenes himself may have passed over this puzzling phrase because its
meaning was already uncertain or unpopular.26 Whatever its original sense,
this cryptic clause is attested early in the tradition, was not prompted by the
orator’s comment, and probably derives from the law itself.
Yet, if we had only divergent phrases such as these in Aristokrates, we would
hardly insist that the early editor must have relied on an independent source
for the wording of the laws that he inserted above the orator’s recitation. The
odd clause or jumbled phrasing may be simply due to later processing. In
Timokrates, however, we find a more significant pattern of deviation. As we
consider in §V, that disparity may have something to do with the speechwriter’s
predicament: Timokrates is probably a speech for circulation in a case that
never went to trial; the argumentation wanders. But it begins with a similarly
documentary focus.
Immediately after the first reading of Timokrates’ law (§§39–40),
(B)
which seems largely reliable and falls within the stichometry, we find another
text that fits that description: Diokles’ law on the application of statutes in the
early restoration era. Laws enacted under the old democracy were again valid;
those that were enacted and recorded in Eukleides’ archonship (403/2) were
valid from that date; those that were enacted thereafter were not retroactive
but valid “from the day of enactment, unless a starting date has been attached”
(ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἴ τῳ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα
δεῖ ἄρχειν, 24.42). The inserted document then concludes with a plausible
provision for the council secretary to make systematic notation in the standing
laws, as to which time frame applies.27 Of all these rules, Demosthenes gives
a paraphrase only for the clause requiring that laws be valid from the day of
enactment unless there is a time specified; he wants to suggest that the rule is
thrown into confusion because Timokrates’ law ignores such distinctions. But
the critical conflict seems to be that Timokrates made his surety law without

Sosin 2016 concludes that justifiable homicide for roadway encounters would have
favored the horse-driving elite. Perhaps with regard to such relics, Demosthenes anticipates the objection (23.64) that “these rules are worthless and wrongly devised and what
(Aristokrates) has authored is just fine.”
27 The very last clause seems superfluous: must the secretary thereafter designate every
new law as valid from enactment, unless there is a starting date?
26
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any limitation; it would alter the application of old laws and might mitigate
penalties prescribed long ago. Demosthenes points up the conflict (44) but
gives no summary of the old law that this contradicts.
Whatever text Demosthenes and his client actually included here among
the paragegrammenoi, it must have indicated some principle of statutory
limitation. There was no more famous statute of limitations than the one that
was vital to the restoration of democracy, not to apply public remedies to any
offense before the year of Eukleides.28 So the ancient editor would naturally
look back to that era, if he did not have the actual document in hand. If he had
any doubt of the context, the restoration-era laws cited later in this argument
(54, 56, and 59) would point in that direction.
Thus in Diokles’ law we have a solid case for a document that (1) was
included in the line-count edition,29 and (2) could not have been concocted
from the orator’s comment, but (3) belonged to a set of laws that was particularly well known and accessible. How, then, did the early editor come to
introduce this document?
Here again it is certainly possible that the editor had access to a copy of
key documents from the indictment itself. That full text of the graphē would
include the targeted measure and the laws in conflict with it, and copies were
preserved for many years in the officers’ archives and, perhaps for generations, among legal papers important to the client and his family, if not also
in the speechwriter’s collection. Perhaps in the course of gathering a corpus,
that documentary preface was attached to its speech. Then, at some point in
the third century b.c.e., an early editor saw fit to write those documents (or
significant excerpts) into the main text. Small deviations might result from
careless or officious hands in the later tradition. That scenario seems to me a
reasonable possibility in the case of Aristokrates. But in Timokrates there are
more troublesome disparities, and these seem sufficient to disprove any direct
access to the paragegrammenoi as assembled for the official record.
In the targeted law itself, Timokrates’ Surety Law (Dem. 24.39–40 and
71), the content is problematic at beginning and end. In the first reading, the
document concludes with a surprising flexibility: those who owe in the ninth
prytany are to pay (or have their sureties pay) by “the ninth or tenth prytany
of the next year.” As Schöll supposed, the tenth prytany makes more sense for
the end of the first year (when debtors are in default), and the ninth prytany,
for the next year (by which sureties must pay); but the original would have
28
29

With Andoc. 1.82–89, see Carawan 2013: 186–93, and (on Diokles’ law) 266–67.
Canevaro 2013a: 121, “definitely part of the Urexemplar.”
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alphabetic numbers which are easily reversed; the dubious “ninth or tenth”
prytany was a feeble attempt to make the garbled version more plausible. In the
second reading (71) a name is added in the prescript for the chairman of the
proedroi, who put the matter to a vote: τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισεν Ἀριστοκλῆς
Μυρρινούσιος. His demotic indicates that he belonged to Pandionis, the tribe
in prytany, which cannot be.30 So Schöll suggested, again, a common sort of
corruption: Aristokles belonged to the less familiar deme, Myrrhinoutta, up
the coast from Myrrhinous, from a different tribe (Aigeis). But that would
not explain why, if both documents were copied from the same record, we
have that feature in one reading and not in the other.
These two readings of Timokrates’ law allow one of two explanations: either
the documents were haphazardly added into the Urexemplar, or significant
alterations crept in with later tradition.31 The latter seems the more likely. For
surely the line-count editor would follow the same text for both inserts, and
there is no obvious reason why he would include details from the prescript
in one reading and not in the other. The stichometry makes it all but certain
that most of the material was included in both passages, but for the second
reading of Timokrates’ law (71) there is room for a small expansion beyond the
stichometry, and that may account for the extra line identifying the epistatēs. 32
In view of these difficulties, it seems sensible to reserve judgment on the
odd set of contradictions that emerge among the documents that come after
Diokles’ law, especially in §§50–63, as these fall within the sections (E–Z) where
the manuscripts show a notable expansion beyond the line-count edition.
First of all, the same superfluous detail was probably added at the end of
the laws in §§45 and 59: both laws call for a quorum of 6000 in the assembly
voting by ballot (for a more accurate count than show of hands)33; but some
30 Cf. Canevaro 2013a: 119–20, with Schöll 1886: 132–33. Proedroi were chosen from
the tribes not in prytany, an innovation of the decade or so after 392, and identifying
the epistatēs, the official who put the law to a vote of the nomothetai, actually rings true.
Presiders were probably chosen for the nomothetai in the same way as for council and
assembly; in IG ii3 452 = IG ii2 222 the epistatēs for the nomothetai is not the one who
presided in the assembly at the enactment of the decree because from one session to the
next new proedroi were selected.
31 As Canevaro acknowledges (2013a: 118): “It is not impossible that clauses and further specifications were added to the older documents when the newer were eventually
inserted.”
32 Burger, counting lines (1891: 10), finds that the section is right on average (83), if the
document is included. Canevaro’s count of letters (2013a: 21), allows for a small expansion
of a line or two (3614 characters, against an average of about 3550).
33 On methods of voting in the assembly see Hansen 1977.

54

Edwin Carawan

scribe or editor has added, that the vote must be “by secret ballot,” κρύβδην.
In the first instance, in §45, we find a law allowing proposals to benefit atimoi
and opheilontes (disfranchised and indebted to the polis) only if the proposer
is given permission or immunity (adeia) by “secret” balloting. The same procedure is indicated in §59, in an exception to the rule against laws affecting
particular persons (ep’ andri) and not applicable to all.
In both documents (§§45 and 59) the phrase οἷς ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην
ψηφιζομένοις seems doubtful (as also in Andokides 1.87),34 and by discounting those clauses, the line count is a little closer to the original.35 In the first
instance (45), the inserted document follows precisely the sequence of features
summarized by the orator, in much the same language, until we get to that last
detail, which seems redundant after ψηφισαμένων. Indeed, the call for secret
ballot seems pointless in a rule regarding permission to offer proposals, when
the vote on the proposal itself would not require ballot voting at all.36 In any
event, it is not the sort of departure from the orator’s words that proves authenticity. It seems to me more likely that the detail, “voting by secret ballot,” was
added by someone who knew the phrase from other citations (such as [Dem.]
59.89). In the searchable corpus of Attic inscriptions there is no instance of
the formula κρύβδην ψηφιζόμενοι referring to the citizen assembly or any
such forum of thousands.37 So brief an expansion would not in itself affect the
line count, but the sum of many such intrusions could certainly contribute to
the surplus for §§50–63. And that process, whereby the text expands beyond
In Andoc. 1.87 the exception is also doubtful: cf. Canevaro and Harris 2012: 117–18.
By Canevaro’s calculation based on letter count (2013a: 21), the two sections E–Z
= §§47–68 fall short of the average without the documents but seem too long with all
included (by roughly 6 lines or less). Burger 1891: 10 suggested a larger expansion: he
counted 175 lines total for the two sections, where the average per section is 83.
36 The epigraphic comparanda that Canevaro cites for secret ballot (2013a: 132 n166)
actually deal with voting in much smaller groups where secrecy and sanctity of ritual were
a hedge against undue influence (IG ii2 1141 = Agora 16.44, special meeting of the tribe
Kekropis on the acropolis; IG ii2 1183, the ten euthynoi for the deme). Add to those IG ii2
1237 (decree of Demotionidai) 82–84: in voting on inductees the phratriarch is not to
give the ballots to all until members of the candidate’s own thiasos have voted “secretly,
taking their ballots from the altar.”
37 Ψηφίζεσθαι usually means “vote by ballot,” without qualification, in opposition
to χειροτονεῖν. But the scholiasts seem to seize upon κρύβδην as showing that the assembly functions like a court: in comment on this passage (111 Dilts), one explains
the quorum of 6000 as meaning “not dikastai but (chosen) from the demos, imitating
dikastai (μιμουμένων δικαστάς); wherefore [Demosthenes] introduces the proper feature
of dikastai, τὸ ‘κρύβδην’.”
34
35
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the old line count simply because officious hands are constantly improving
upon it, must make us cautious about the details, even where line-count and
verifiable content would otherwise indicate original and reliable documents.
The law inserted at §54, barring reprise of res judicata, is an even more
clumsy fabrication (as Canevaro concludes, 2013a: 142). That is especially
significant for our inquiry because we might expect that law (along with those
that follow in the same vein, §56) to be central to the paragegrammenoi, the
list of laws in conflict with Timokrates’ surety law; for the latter would effectively cancel or mitigate the penalties imposed by the court, thus (arguably)
contradicting the old rule that settled cases not be decided anew. And yet it
looks as though there was no documentary text of this law in the line-count
edition. It is perhaps the clearest of several indications that the early editor
was left to his own devices.
Now Timokrates’ habeas corpus law38 is a second instance (after Diokles’
law) where the inserted document seems plausible and well crafted but goes
well beyond anything the orator says in his argument. This intriguing text is
still within those sections (47–68) where manuscripts have expanded beyond
the line count; some of the documentary material would fit, but not all. The
content of this law is of considerable interest: it requires that “all who ... by
impeachment” (κατ᾽ εἰσαγγελίαν) of the council are currently under arrest
or in custody but not yet remanded to the thesmothetai for trial, the Eleven
are to bring to court within thirty days or as soon thereafter as practicable;
anyone willing may prosecute; if the defendant is convicted at trial, the heliaia is to assess whatever penalty he deserves to suffer or pay: “And if a fine
is assessed, he shall be imprisoned until he pay whatever judgment has been
given against him.” But this earlier law by the same legislator is cited only
for that last clause, as it poses a conflict with the targeted law which would
allow those burdened by fines to post sureties and remain at liberty. Indeed,
Demosthenes has that last provision repeated for emphasis and says nothing
more about the other content of that earlier law.
In this instance we can see quite clearly how later alterations have muddled
the tradition. It is only within the last century (or so) that scholars have accepted the reading of S, the tenth-century Parisinus, as practically certain: “Be
38 As dubbed by Rhodes 1979: 107, Timokrates’ earlier measure (§63), against jailing a
defendant impeached by council. Canevaro suggests that this may be one of the intrusive
texts (that stretch the line count), and indeed, it seems incidental to the major laws in
conflict. Another likely intrusion, not confirmed by the orator’s comment, is the penalty
attached to the law against petitioning the assembly for some reprieve (§50): if the proedros
puts it to a vote, he shall be atimos.
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it decided by nomothetai” (δέδοχθαι νομοθέταις). Aside from one corrector,
the other manuscripts introduce this law with thesmothetai in the place of
nomothetai (a confusion common among the scholia). There may also be
some garbling of the clause introduced with “all who,” ὅποσοι, followed first
by present indicative and then by subjunctive without ἄν.39 And it is surprising that Demosthenes did not deal with the main provisions of this law, if
the document conveys those accurately: it provided relief to men already
jailed (νῦν εἰσι ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ) and to anyone in custody henceforth. Those
features might have provoked the same objections that Demosthenes raises
against Timokrates’ surety law, suggesting a pattern of illegal legislation: this,
too, is a law for the benefit of particular persons and without limitation. On
balance, it seems reasonable to suppose that this text represents an authentic
law framed to introduce something like habeas corpus for those jailed summarily by council, though the version we have is dubious on the details and
it is doubtful whether any or all of it was included in the Urexemplar. At best,
as in the law on res judicata (54), the early editor may have supplied a kernel
of historical value, only to have it spoiled by later processing.
Briefly to summarize the findings of this section: In Aristokrates the only
significant deviations, in §§28 and 53, have reasonable claims to authenticity. But in Timokrates, while much of the documentary material fits the same
reliable pattern (as in Diokles’ law, §42), there are divergent details that were
probably added in later tradition (in §§45, 59, 63, 71), and some that point
to the editor’s unaided recollection, as in the restoration-era laws presented
in §§54 and 56.

v. the earliest documents in aristokrates and
timokrates
From this survey, I conclude that the stichometric documents in each case
either derived from the indictment, the full text of the graphē listing laws in
conflict, or were inspired by that model. In Aristokrates either explanation is
possible; the first is at least as likely as not. In Timokrates, only the second
explanation seems viable, as the disparities show that the early editor was
sometimes trying to reconstruct documents that he did not have in hand.

39 Canevaro 2013a: 155 finds a parallel in the Demotionidai decree, where the “all who”
refers to cases already pending, “which have not been adjudicated,” with ὅποσοι followed
by the aorist indicative; on the delay in adjudication and complications that resulted, see
Carawan 2010: 384–88.
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This approach answers the first two questions: (1) Why did the early editor
include this particular set of documents in the stichometric edition and not
the others? And (2) in the case of Aristokrates, why would anyone bother to
present as a separate text what is promptly repeated by the orator?
(1) The editor focused on this set of documents (in both speeches) because
he knew that these measures were crucial to the case: whether he had the indictment in hand or had to reconstruct it, he was prompted by the epilogue
to Aristokrates and other passages emphasizing the paragegrammenoi. (2) In
Aristokrates he matched the excerpts of law with the speaker’s comments
rather closely for much the same reason, because the orators themselves demonstrated that technique: in this kind of case, where the verdict should turn
upon clauses in conflict, the orator would rehearse them for the jury, just as
Euthykles does. But then there is the question (3), why are the documents in
Timokrates not so well tailored to the argument as in Aristokrates?
In Timokrates the early editor included material that ranges well beyond the
orator’s comment. He refrained from the sort of rank fabrication that marred
the later tradition,40 and one might suppose that this early editor endeavored
to recover those documents from official records or reliable historical sources.
But I doubt that he did much more research than his successors; he worked
primarily with what he had at hand or in mind.
In Aristokrates we can imagine a conservative process at work. If, in fact,
the editor inherited a copy of the graphē itself, complete with paragegrammenoi nomoi, he would be inclined to salvage the relevant laws when the
indictment was no longer of much interest as a separate text. Originally the
client probably kept that text of the indictment together with his copy of the
speech; the speechwriter may have kept another, and it may even have been
attached to an early version for limited publication. But when the corpus had
to be converted to a more marketable format for a much wider readership,
there was no demand for that indictment in the papyrus roll, as an appendix
to the speech. Whatever interest there was in such artifacts of the law, that
commodity was repackaged to meet the prevailing interest in Demosthenes’
brilliance. So, rather than simply dispense with the indictment altogether, an
enterprising editor saw fit to copy the laws-in-evidence into the main text. That
consolidation of the material made for a measurably longer speech that would
fetch a little better price. Thus the incorporation of these documents came

Some of the most obvious concoctions appear in Demosthenes’ On the Crown: for
instance, the flimsy excuse for a decree regarding Demosthenes’ Trierarchic Law at 18.105;
see Canevaro’s thorough analysis, 2013a: 267–71.
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together with the creation of the line-count edition. In the case of Dem. 23,
that consolidation would be prompted or justified by the epilogue recognizing
the crucial importance of those laws-in-conflict for this minor masterpiece
of argumentation. Of course that scenario is just a conjecture, but it offers
an attractive answer to Franke’s nagging question about the documents in
Aristokrates: Why would any editor bother?
In the case of Timokrates the process was rather different. Much of the
material from the paragegrammenoi seems to fit the same stage of transmission, but these inserts are not so well tailored to the orator’s words. Of course
some variation may result from the difference in issues: the case against
Aristokrates was squarely based on a solid set of procedural laws; the case
against Timokrates, not so much. Indeed, the speech against Timokrates
seems unfinished. So MacDowell concluded, from major incongruity and
haphazard arrangement in the latter half of the speech; he suggested that the
case never went to trial (2009: 194–96). In other cases of this kind—notably
in Leptines—the speech dealt with points in dispute that emerged on the way
to trial (Dem. 20.98–101). In Timokrates it is only acknowledged near the end
(187–89)41 that Androtion and his associates have paid over to the polis the
9½ talents they owed and thus preempted much of the outrage that prosecutors were hoping to stir up. Ordinarily, in a more finished oration, we would
expect that maneuver to be countered more squarely.
If the lawsuit against Timokrates was abandoned before it ever got to trial,
that would help to explain why the paragegrammenoi are neither so compelling nor so closely matched by the orator’s commentary as in Aristokrates. In
a moot case, it is rather less likely that any draft of the indictment was kept
among the client’s papers or the speechwriter’s, or that it made its way into the
Metroon to be accessible generations later.42 The text we have is a version of

Added to the rambling conclusion, along with the invective against Androtion
(160–86) that is largely borrowed from Dem. 22.47–78.
42 On the dubious evidence for archiving verdicts in the Metroon, see Sickinger 1999:
131–33. But as Harris points out (2013: 155), even in abandoned cases a copy of the indictment was kept on file by the officers in charge and might be retrieved from them even
years later. Thus in the case of Theokrines against Mikon ([Dem.] 58.7–10), we learn that
Theokrines had brought a phasis to the grammateus for the port authorities who posted
it for public notice; Theokrines then dropped the case, before it got to anakrisis. Yet that
phasis was presented in the later case against Theokrines and witnessed by the officer who
probably kept a copy among documents of his tenure, on guard against charges at euthynai
or thereafter; cf. Faraguna, ed. 2013: 168–69. But abandoned indictments were probably
not included in the central archive and thus rather difficult to retrieve at a much later date
41

Documents in the Case: Demosthenes 23–24

59

the speech for circulation, not a speech for trial but one that the author seems
to have freely expanded. And the enterprising editor seems to have made the
most of that commodity for his market: he recognized the importance of the
laws-in-conflict from their use in Aristokrates and from Aischines’ insistence
upon them in Ktesiphon; and presumably he realized that those documents
could add a nice premium to the total line count. But without the documents
in hand, he had to recover them from other resources. He could get the gist
from the orator’s comment, but much of the content had to be (re)collected
from research or common knowledge.
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